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OrganizatiOnal 
Determinants Of Wage 
mODeratiOn
By LUCIO BACCARO and MARCO SIMONI*
tHis article deals with one of the founding themes in the litera-ture on comparative political economy—the impact of industrial 
relations institutions on cross-country differences in macroeconomic 
performance—and focuses on the internal governance characteristics 
of trade union confederations. the literature on the economic effects 
of industrial relations structures is large and spans several decades. Yet 
most of it, particularly the newest, ignores internal governance condi-
tions and implicitly assumes that once the structure of collective bar-
gaining is coordinated or centralized, no other organizational factor 
needs to be in place for wage moderation to materialize.1 recent po-
litical economic studies either disregard the internal decision-making 
process of trade unions2 or take at face value the conclusions of neocor-
poratist studies from the 1980s.3
We argue that the internal governance processes within trade union 
confederations are important for wage moderation but that the rela-
tionship is very different from the one hypothesized by classic neo-
corporatist studies. Controlling for a number of factors, including the 
degree of collective bargaining coordination, the organizational variable 
that correlates with moderate wage growth is the degree to which trade 
union confederations engage in a democratic organizational process 
that directly involves workers in collective bargaining approval; it is not 
the leaders’ ability to impose their decisions upon lower-level structures 
and affiliates. furthermore, the evidence indicates that the coordina-
*the authors wish to thank Joseph Doyle, thomas Kochan, Peter Hall, Bob Hancké, rickard 
locke, steve Pischke, Kenneth scheve, David soskice, and Peter swenson for helpful comments on 
previous versions. marco simoni gratefully acknowledges financial support from the British acad-
emy.
1 layard, nickell, and Jackman 2005; Blanchard 2006.
2 e.g., mares 2006.
3 iversen 1999; traxler and Kittel 2001.
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4 Przeworski and Wallerstein 1982; eichengreen 1996; eichengreen and iversen 1999.
tion of collective bargaining and a process of democratic ratification are 
complements that magnify each other’s wage-dampening effect.
We engage in an econometric analysis to document the existence 
of a relationship of robust dependence between wage moderation and 
worker involvement in contract approval, and then, through a historical 
reconstruction of developments in ireland and italy, illustrate the causal 
mechanisms that undergird this statistical association. these are the 
two countries in our sample in which both the involvement of work-
ers in decision making and the coordination of collective bargaining 
increased the most, and thus provide an opportunity to investigate in 
greater detail the uncovered complementarity between wage coordina-
tion and rank-and-file involvement and its effect on wage moderation. 
the case-study analysis suggests that the process of contract approval 
contributes to wage moderation by strengthening the legitimacy of 
top union leaders vis-à-vis both individual rank-and-file members and 
contrarian organized factions. as such, leaders can resolve conflicting 
claims inside their organizations at lower wage levels than would be 
achieved (all other things being equal) by a less participatory gover-
nance process.
the article is divided into four parts. it begins with an analysis of the 
theoretical links between the internal organization of collective actors 
and bargaining outcomes. next, it moves to an econometric analysis 
of the determinants of wage growth in sixteen Organization for eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OeCd) countries between 1974 
and 2000. then, through case studies of ireland and italy, it illustrates 
the causal mechanisms by which worker involvement in contract rati-
fication leads to more moderate union demands. finally, it concludes 
with remarks on the relationship between wage moderation and em-
ployment growth.
wAge MOdeRAtION ANd ORgANIzAtIONAL PROCeSSeS wIthIN  
tRAde UNIONS
a key theme in the comparative political economy literature is the ex-
ploration of the institutional conditions that allow wages to grow closely 
in line with or even below productivity increases. Wage moderation is 
generally regarded as an important driver of a country’s economic per-
formance. some literature links it to rapid capital accumulation and 
economic growth in Western europe after World War ii.4 more re-
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cent literature argues that the ability of countries such as ireland or 
the netherlands to achieve lower unemployment rates than other eu-
ropean countries in the 1990s and early 2000s is linked to their capac-
ity (associated with effective collective bargaining institutions) to keep 
wage growth in check.5
Political economists seem to have reached a consensus, increasingly 
shared by macroeconomists, that coordinated or centralized bargaining 
leads to wage moderation and through that channel to lower unem-
ployment—either directly or by moderating the impact of restrictive 
monetary policies implemented by independent central banks.6 inter-
estingly, this literature pays little to no attention to the organizational 
characteristics of the collective actors who participate in bargaining, 
and therefore implicitly assumes that centralized or coordinated bar-
gaining needs no other condition to deliver wage restraint.
to the extent that organizational factors are taken into account at 
all, the problem they pose is conceptualized as a horizontal problem 
of coordination among different unions. for example, where multiple 
unions try to coordinate on a single wage policy, an individual union is 
tempted to defect from the agreement especially if it is small enough to 
reap the benefits of its action (a higher wage) without paying the costs 
of defection (an increase in consumer prices).7 Hence bargaining coor-
dination and the associated wage restraint should be more difficult to 
achieve where the representational structure is more fragmented and, 
conversely, easier where it is more concentrated.
in addition to issues of horizontal collaboration or competition 
among unions, the vertical relationship between peak-level and decen-
tralized structures and between leaders and members also seems rel-
evant to the ability of trade unions to deliver wage moderation. this 
theme is virtually ignored in the most recent literature but was dis-
cussed extensively in the neocorporatist literature of the 1980s. that 
literature concludes that the most propitious organizational context for 
wage moderation is one in which trade union confederations are highly 
centralized, decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of 
a limited number of peak leaders, and the influence of rank-and-file 
workers is kept to a minimum.8
5 Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Blanchard and Philippon 2004; Baccaro and simoni 2007.
6 see, in a very long list, Cameron 1984; Calmfors and Driffill 1988; soskice 1990; scharpf 1991; 
garrett 1998; Hall and franzese 1998; iversen 1999; soskice and iversen 2000; traxler and Kittel 
2001; franzese 2002; layard, nickell, and Jackman 2005; nickell, nunziata, and Ochel 2005; mares 
2006.
7 golden 1993; iversen 1999; Carlin and soskice 2006.
8 schmitter 1974.
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the literature accepts mancur Olson’s argument9 that more broadly 
representative (or encompassing) union organizations are more likely 
to voluntarily agree to wage restraint than small and sectoral ones. 
However, the literature does not stop there; it also specifies the in-
ternal conditions that protect large, encompassing organizations from 
potentially disruptive centrifugal tendencies. this further specification 
is necessary because in formally democratic countries trade unions are 
voluntary associations. even when wage restraint is in the unions’ orga-
nizational interests, it is more than likely to conflict with the interests 
of at least some rank-and-file groups. these groups may conceivably 
react to this discrepancy either by demanding a shift in union bargain-
ing policy from moderate to more aggressive, or by leaving the more 
responsible, encompassing organization and joining—or establishing 
ex novo—other, less encompassing associations better capable of satis-
fying their specific interests.
Half-descriptively, half-prescriptively, the neocorporatist literature 
argues that to ensure internal compliance with centralized wage stipu-
lations, decision-making power needs to be concentrated in the hands 
of a limited number of national leaders (assumed to be more long-
term oriented than their rank-and-file counterparts). in addition, these 
leaders need to be effectively insulated from the disruptive influence of 
their base. Based on these premises, the neocorporatist literature un-
derscores the importance of monopolistic associations and compulsory 
or semicompulsory membership.10 readily apparent at least in some 
portion of the literature is also a less-than-enthusiastic stance in re-
gard to trade union democracy; enabling the rank-and-file to influence 
union choices through elections and worker referenda threatens to sub-
vert centralized wage restraint.11
the literature’s widely held view that achieving wage moderation re-
quires union organizations with a capacity to impose leaders’ decisions 
on members12 has rarely been submitted to empirical testing. When it 
has been, results have seemed contradictory. a small number of country 
studies appear to corroborate it,13 but other studies—including large-n 
ones—find no systematic link between the success of centralized wage 
regulation and a lack of internal democracy.14
9 Olson 1965; 1982.
10 schmitter 1974; Panitch 1979; Offe 1981.
11 schmitter 1974; streeck 1988; 1994; Pemberton 1988; Przeworski 1991, 12; stepan-norris and 
zeitlin 1995.
12 this view is found for example in garrett and Way 1999, 414–15; golden, Wallerstein, and 
lange 1999, 195; iversen 1999, 48; traxler and Kittel 2001, 65.
13 streeck 1982; Wolfe 1985; Hardiman 1988.
14 regini 1984; lange 1984; armingeon 1986; golden 1993.
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We contend that the neocorporatist argument is crucially dependent 
on two dubious assumptions and a fallacious practical conclusion as-
sociated with them. the assumptions are that the rank-and-files’ policy 
preferences are determined outside of the organizational process and 
are systematically more extreme than the leaders’. the fallacious con-
clusion is that the only organizational mechanisms available to leaders 
to ensure worker compliance with centralized agreements are those of 
hierarchical authority and control, including, for example, the power to 
sign an agreement independently of workers’ consensus, direct appoint-
ment of workers’ representatives, centralized control over strike funds, 
and veto power over wage agreements signed by lower-level structures.
assuming that preferences are exogenous and fixed, it must be noted 
that if members are systematically more extreme than leaders, then di-
rect rank-and-file control over organizational policy (through proce-
dures like ratification of collective agreements or reelection of union 
representatives) may indeed lead to militancy and/or unwillingness to 
compromise. this situation, however, is far from being the norm. for 
example, in the U.K. in the thatcher/major era, union governance re-
forms that introduced compulsory balloting prior to strikes as a way of 
limiting union militancy were motivated by exactly the opposite view, 
namely that leaders have systematically more extreme preferences than 
members.15
in addition, alessandro Pizzorno’s classic account of workers’ mili-
tancy in italy16 suggests that one should not take for granted that 
union policy will automatically reflect the preferences of the majority 
of workers. the unions’ power is largely based on their ability to mo-
bilize workers in strikes. Without democratic mechanisms for register-
ing worker preferences, leaders may take their cues from the revealed 
preferences of a biased subsample—the workers who participate in or 
promote collective actions. in this way, in the absence of democratic 
decision-making procedures, extreme preferences may prevail even 
when the majority is moderate. Within trade unions, this situation 
would alter the internal balance of power in favor of vocal factions pur-
suing more militant agendas because workers who identify with these 
factions are more likely to participate in strikes than workers with less 
intense preferences.17
furthermore, although it is customary in economic and political eco-
nomic research to model trade union behavior as if workers’ preferences 
15 see Undy and martin 1984, and Undy et al. 1996.
16 Pizzorno 1978.
17 sabel 1981.
 deteRMINANtS Of wAge MOdeRAtION 599
were given and fixed and leaders’ choices as reflecting the exogenous 
preferences of the median worker,18 these assumptions seem empiri-
cally untenable. a paper presented in 2010 based on microdata19 shows 
that even when the issue at stake is highly salient and workers can 
be expected to have made up their minds about it in advance, more 
than 30 percent of workers are uncertain about the options being con-
sidered before the ratification process is initiated. these workers form 
their preferences during the ratification process by heeding the advice 
of union leaders. in particular, they become favorable or unfavorable 
toward the agreement at stake depending on the way it is presented to 
them by leaders in assemblies. the resulting aggregate effects are large 
enough to transform an initially unfavorable majority into a favorable 
one. in other words, a democratic ratification process does not just reg-
ister a positive majority but helps to shape it.
the claim about the endogeneity of worker preferences resonates 
with the growing literature on the preference-shaping effects of de-
mocracy.20 this literature is no longer just normative or theoretical. 
there is by now ample empirical evidence that discourse and delibera-
tion have net effects on preference formation and not solely aggrega-
tive effects.21
in light of the discussion above, neocorporatism’s practical conclu-
sion that hierarchical control is the only mechanism available for com-
pliance seems untenable.22 We hypothesize that democratic processes, 
such as assemblies and ratification of agreements, may lead to wage 
moderation through two mechanisms that are not mutually exclusive. 
first, if the majority of workers has moderate preferences, union de-
mocracy may help this group emerge and prevail against a vocal minor-
ity whose mobilization capacities may be greater. second, to the extent 
that union leaders manage to persuade their members that their true 
interests are better served by moderate wage policies, the communi-
cative processes associated with union democracy may contribute to 
constructing the moderate majority in question.23
18 farber 1978; Kaufman and martinez-Vazquez 1990; Booth 1995.
19 Baccaro 2010.
20 Habermas 1984; Cohen 1989; Habermas 1996; gutmann and thompson 1996; Cohen 1996; 
Bohman 1996.
21 luskin, fishkin, and Jowell 2002; Druckman and nelson 2003; Barabas 2004; Druckman 2004; 
Humphreys, masters, and sandbu 2006; luskin, fishkin, and Hahn 2007; farrar et al. 2010.
22 see also Dunleavy 1991.
23 the relationship between the preferences of leaders and the initial preferences of followers could 
conceivably take other forms. if leaders and followers are negatively inclined there should not be any 
union engagement in wage moderation. alternatively, if they are both favorably inclined, the opposite 
should happen. in the hypothetical case in which followers are initially favorably inclined, but leaders
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We also hypothesize that the importance of internal democratic 
processes may have increased over time due to the waning of classic 
political exchange.24 in earlier years a democratic process of decision 
making was probably less important because unions engaging in wage 
restraint could show their members that they were delivering the goods 
in other forms (e.g., welfare-state expansion, working-time reductions, 
or other side payments), and thus had a lesser need to worry about pro-
cedural legitimacy.25 as time progressed and financial problems limited 
the further expansion of the welfare state,26 it became more difficult for 
unions to exchange wage moderation with more favorable welfare pro-
visions, or, more generally, increased public spending.27 this resonates 
with the recent literature on new social pacts, i.e., forms of centralized 
bargaining in which there is no longer a clear quid pro quo.28 reliance 
on democratic procedures for legitimation may have become more im-
portant than in the past. to use fritz scharpf ’s vocabulary, there may 
have been a transition over time from legitimation through outcomes 
to legitimation through procedures.29
in sum, most of the literature (especially economic) ignores the or-
ganizational features of trade unions engaged in centralized or coor-
dinated bargaining and therefore assumes that these features do not 
matter for wage moderation. some of the literature argues that only 
the impact of concentration versus fragmentation of union representa-
tion matters. an older neocorporatist literature argues that a union or-
ganization in which rank-and-file workers can voice their preferences 
on wage outcomes is less propitious for wage restraint than a more 
hierarchical organization. a newer literature however, which we have 
contributed to,30 argues that democratic processes help union leaders 
mobilize consensus for controversial and potentially unpopular choices. 
in the next section we test all these hypotheses through multivariate 
analysis.
are against, we would expect that leaders may be able to change the followers’ attitudes through delib-
erative mechanisms. in this paper we focus on the configuration that has most intrigued the literature 
on wage moderation, namely the one where confederation leaders are favorably inclined towards wage 
moderation but have to ensure the compliance of an initially reluctant follower base.
24 Pizzorno 1978b; mares 2006.
25 Pizzorno 1978b; Katzenstein 1985.
26 Pierson 2001.
27 mares 2006.
28 regini 1997; Wallerstein, golden, and lange 1997; Perez 2000; Compston 2002; Culpepper 
2002; molina and rhodes 2002; traxler 2004; Hassel 2006; Hamann and Kelly 2007; avdagic 2010.
29 scharpf 1999.
30 Baccaro 2003; Baccaro and simoni 2007.
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AN eCONOMetRIC ANALySIS Of the deteRMINANtS Of  
wAge MOdeRAtION
MeASURINg UNION gOveRNANCe ChARACteRIStICS
in order to measure the extent of the peak levels’ hierarchical control 
of union confederations over affiliates and members, we followed lane 
Kenworthy31 and aggregated available information on whether or not 
the confederation: 1) has the power to appoint affiliates; 2) can veto 
wage agreements of affiliates; 3) can veto strikes; and 4) has its own 
strike funds. in this way we obtained a 0–4 index of confederation hi-
erarchy.32
Because no cross-country indicator was available to measure the 
extent of rank-and-file involvement in collective bargaining by union 
confederations, we created our own. in doing so, we were faced with 
two problems. first, we found a dearth of secondary sources detailing 
the internal procedures of trade unions—a sign that, until recently, the 
construct was not thought to be particularly relevant for wage behavior. 
thus we relied primarily on interviews with trade union leaders. sec-
ond, we found union democracy to be a loaded and slippery concept. 
if one talks with trade unionists about it, one finds that virtually all 
trade unions may be considered democratic (or non) according to some 
definition. those on the left of the union spectrum seem to consider 
democracy visible in its outcomes. When unions are not vocal and mil-
itant it is interpreted as a sign that workers have been hoodwinked by 
their leaders and that therefore a democratic deficit is present.33 Oth-
ers argue that to the extent that the formal procedures and guarantees 
included in the constitutions of major trade union confederations—
namely the fact that workers are allowed to affiliate freely; have free-
dom of expression; elect their floor-shop representatives; and elect, 
either directly or indirectly, the delegates to higher-level structures in-
cluding the confederation congress—can be likened to those existing 
in many democratic polities, trade unions are at least as democratic as 
national governments.34
We do not address here the normative issue about what constitutes 
a genuine union democracy. Our indicator, contract ratification (CR), is 
31 Kenworthy 2003.
32 Data from golden, lange, and Wallersten 2006 (henceforth referred to as the gLw database). 
We updated the measure from 1993 to 2000 and coded ireland based on the same sources used to 
construct the measure of contract ratification (see below in this article).
33 see Bertinotti 1991; minkin 1991, 159–65; Cremaschi 1993.
34 Willey 1971.
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less ambitious and seeks to capture the extent to which rank-and-file 
workers are involved in the process of approving collective bargaining 
outcomes at the sectoral and/or national levels. CR varies from 0 to 2. 
the score is 2 when national collective agreements, in particular the 
most politically divisive ones, are adopted through secret ballots among 
members (or, a fortiori, workers). an intermediate case (CR = 1) is re-
corded when union leaders only consult workers informally on collective 
agreements, asking either for a show of hands or for opinions in open 
assemblies. CR is null when the leadership never consults members over 
collective agreements or, alternatively, when there are no sectoral or 
national collective bargaining agreements in the country in question.35 
the latter rule creates a linkage between contract ratification and bar-
gaining centralization. the correlation between the contract ratification 
index and a measure of collective bargaining centralization is positive, 
but far from perfect (ρ = 0.41).36 additionally, it should be emphasized 
that the measures of confederation hierarchy and contract ratification 
are orthogonal, not negatively correlated (ρ = 0.07). this means that a 
union confederation could involve the rank-and-file in contract rati-
fication while simultaneously retaining authority to veto contract and 
strike decisions, make appointments within affiliate organizations, and 
keep its own strike funds.37
all other things being equal, a union that involves the rank-and-file 
in contract approval should be considered more democratic than one 
that does not. However, we cannot assess the normative quality of the 
organizational processes involved and therefore do not mean to imply 
that a union confederation scoring higher on our index is necessarily 
more democratic than another scoring lower. Organizational processes 
within trade union confederations are known to reflect national cultural 
specificities.38 this might contribute to the explanation of why the no-
tion of union democracy is controversial among union practitioners. 
like other existing indicators of industrial relations institutions,39 the 
CR index focuses on objective formal characteristics rather than subjec-
tive interpretations of substance.
the CR index was created for sixteen OeCd countries between 1974 
and 2000. the country scores are based on two waves of interviews 
35 this second instance refers to, in our database, Canada and the U.s. the econometric results 
presented below are robust to alternative or simultaneous dropping of these countries.
36 this is the variable BARgLev2 in the gLw database.
37 an example is the norwegian LO, which scores 2 out of 2 on contract ratification and 3 out of 4 
on confederation hierarchy.
38 Crouch 1992; Hyman 2001.
39 Kenworthy 2003.
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with trade union leaders participating in the international labor Or-
ganization’s (ILO) international labor Conference (in June 2004 and 
2007) and governing Body (in 2004) in geneva, switzerland.40 the 
information was cross-checked with national industrial relations ex-
perts as well as with secondary sources, leading to the scores presented 
in table 1.41
the 0 –2 indicator reveals some interesting differences across coun-
tries, including among those that are traditionally considered to have 
similar trade union structures. among the nordic countries, for exam-
ple, worker ratification is never practiced in sweden (CR = 0). the con-
stitution of the swedish trade union confederation (LO) has stated since 
1941 that the power to decide over collective agreements and industrial 
action must be vested in the executive committee of the national union 
as a condition for membership in the confederation.42 the situation is 
the same in the other two swedish confederations, the swedish con-
federation of professional employees (tCO) and the swedish confed-
eration of professional associations (SACO). in contrast, the constitu-
tion of the norwegian confederation of trade unions (norwegian LO) 
explicitly requires that workers vote on collective agreements through 
referenda. if less than two-thirds of workers affected by the issue par-
ticipate in the ballot, the outcome of the referendum is advisory only. if 
a collective agreement involves more than one union, the confederation 
may decide to organize a joint ballot with the explicit permission of 
the unions in question. similar rules apply to the two other norwegian 
confederations, the yS (a confederation of vocational unions) and the 
Af (a confederation of norwegian professional associations).
in Denmark, ballots are also regularly organized and workers voting 
on collective bargaining agreements is tightly linked with the institu-
tion of state mediation. When collective bargaining reaches an impasse, 
the state mediator is entitled by law to propose the terms of a solution 
that is then voted upon by the unions concerned. most unions, and 
particularly the largest ones, organize secret ballots of their member-
ship prior to voting on a proposed solution. Participation rates in these 
ballots are generally quite low and rejection of the terms is rare though 
it has happened.
Other interesting differences emerge when comparing Belgium and 
the netherlands. in Belgium, the act of 5 December 1968 presumes 
40 see also simoni 2007.
41 a complete list of interviewees and secondary sources is available from the authors upon re-
quest.
42 martin 1984.
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that the delegates of the organizations involved in collective bargaining 
have the power to conclude agreements on behalf of those organiza-
tions. therefore decisions concerning collective agreements are left to 
leaders. for an agreement to be adopted, the leaders need to obtain 
the approval of their organization’s governing body: no rank-and-file 
vote is required. the largest Belgian union, ACv, justifies its governance 
system as follows:
“in the heroic times of the trade union movement . . . leaders were nominated 
directly by the members, who selected . . . those who displayed the greatest 
dynamism and the liveliest zeal for trade union interests . . . . But with the fur-
ther development of membership, the growing complexity of trade unions and 
the centralization of trade union action caused by changes in industrial life, it 
tABLe 1
CONtRACt RAtIfICAtION INdex
Country Period  Score
australia 1974–2000  1
austria 1974–2000  0
Belgium 1974–2000  0
Canada 1974–2000  0
Denmark 1974–2000  2
finlanda 1974–1984
1985–2000
1974-2000
 2 (SAk)b
1 (SAk)
1 (Sttk and 
AkAvA)
france 1974–2000  0
germany 1974–2000  0
ireland 1974–1987
1988–2000
 1
2
italy 1974–1992
1993–2000
 1
2
netherlands 1974–2000  1
norway 1974–2000  2
spain 1974–2000  0
sweden 1974–2000  0
U.K. 1974–2000  1
U.s. 1974–2000  0
a to obtain a single country score, each score is weighted by 
confederation membership using the data in golden, lange, and 
Wallerstein (2006). a list of sources is available from the authors 
upon request.
b SAk is the confederation of salaried employees, Sttk is 
the confederation of professional employees, and AkAvA is the 
confederation of unions for academic professionals.
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proved no longer possible for the leaders to be elected directly by the members. 
. . .[O]rdinary members are not always capable of forming a sound judgment of 
the aptitudes required of possible leaders. Direct election therefore, was replaced 
by appointment, by delegation and by co-optation.”43
in the netherlands, worker participation in collective bargaining nego-
tiation and approval had always been greater than in Belgium. in the 
period covered by our cross-country indicator, ratification of collective 
agreements by workers happened in large meetings and not by secret 
ballot. in november 2003, however, the Dutch trade union federation 
(fNv, the largest Dutch confederation) ran a ballot of its membership 
in an effort to ratify a social-pact compromise with an unfriendly gov-
ernment. the referendum was used to outflank radical groups (officials 
and militants of the main industrial union) and resulted in a narrow 
victory for the fNv leadership. Balloting has been employed on a num-
ber of occasions since then.
in austria and germany, union confederations use similar proce-
dures, in both cases allowing for little direct rank-and-file influence. in 
austria collective bargaining agreements are generally approved by the 
leaders of the unions in question without consulting the rank-and-file. 
Workers are merely informed of the negotiation process and notified of 
the outcomes of bargaining. if the leaders sense discontent that could 
undermine their ability to achieve their declared bargaining goals, 
however, they may consult the members and then make a decision. in 
germany collective agreements are approved by the executive bargain-
ing committees and there is no ballot of the members.
the CR measure varies the most across countries and little over time 
between 1974 and 2000. indeed, it is time-variant for only three of the 
sixteen countries, finland, italy, and ireland. it increases in italy and 
ireland and decreases in finland. although we cannot exclude mea-
surement error, the near time-invariance of this organizational variable 
is likely to reflect the reality of the phenomenon we seek to measure. 
Decision-making procedures within union confederations are likely to 
change little over time because they are shaped by deeply ingrained orga-
nizational practices. Confirming this impression, the measure of confed-
eration hierarchy coded by miriam golden, Peter lange, and michael 
Wallerstein44 is also predominantly cross-sectional. indeed, its longi-
tudinal variation is less than that of the contract ratification measure.45 
43 reported in Blanpain 2004, 222.
44 golden, lange, and Wallerstein 2006.
45 the ratio of within variation to total variation is 26 percent for the contract ratification variable 
and 9 percent for the confederation hierarchy variable. the indicator of hierarchical power of employer
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However, the near time invariance of the contract ratification variables 
suggests that the results of any time-series cross-sectional analysis 
should be interpreted with care.
the dePeNdeNt vARIABLe: wAge gROwth IN effICIeNCy UNItS
to understand whether or not union governance and other institutional 
features affect economic outcomes, a dependent variable that is likely to 
be influenced by them must be defined and measured. Different from 
most previous analyses, which focus on a proxy outcome, e.g., unem-
ployment, we use a direct measure of wage moderation, or, conversely, 
wage militancy—the measure of wage in efficiency units (weU) devel-
oped by Olivier Blanchard.46 in our measure, the real (product) wage is 
divided by an index of total factor productivity (tfP or solow residual), 
which captures technical progress, and then further normalized by the 
labor share.47 the resulting index is a measure of unit labor costs where 
wages are compared with a steady-state rate of labor productivity that 
depends solely on technological progress and not also on changes in 
capital intensity. if the index is greater (smaller) than zero, wages grow 
faster (slower) than technologically determined productivity increases, 
and there is wage militancy (moderation).
Different from other possible measures of wage moderation, e.g., 
unit labor costs, the weU controls for the endogenous impact that real 
wage militancy may have on labor productivity. in the short to me-
dium run, firms may react to wage militancy by substituting labor with 
capital, which is likely to lead to increased labor productivity. through 
this channel, then, wage militancy may generate its own compensating 
productivity increases.48 By using Blanchard’s measure of weU we avoid 
these potential problems of endogeneity.49
tables 2 and 3 begin the analysis with descriptive statistics and sim-
ple cross-tabulations. table 2 displays the average change in the wage 
in efficiency units (1974–2000) by average level of contract ratification. 
the country/years with no ratification procedure in place display the 
highest level of wage militancy (0.38 percent). an intermediate level 
of wage militancy (0.14 percent) is associated to intermediate levels of 
centralization (see below) also coded by golden, lange, and Wallerstein (2006), has no temporal 
variation at all.
46 Blanchard 1997; Blanchard 2000, 300–304; Blanchard and Philippon 2004, 3.
47 formally, this is
48 Hellwig 2004.
49 a full discussion of the rationale for the choice of the weU measure and of the assumptions 
underlying it (within the framework of the solow-swan growth model: Harrod-neutral technological 
progress and economies on the balanced growth path) is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer to 
Blanchard 2006, ch. 12; and Carlin and soskice 2006, 470–81, for details.
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ratification procedure. Considerable wage moderation (-0.46 percent) 
is associated to intense ratification procedures. these preliminary results 
suggest that ratification procedures within trade unions do matter.
table 3 shows a cross-tabulation of weU changes by different levels 
of contract ratification as well as coordination of wage bargaining (wB-
COOR).50 the cross-tabulation contradicts the hypothesis that a highly 
coordinated collective bargaining structure is sufficient for wage mod-
eration and that organizational processes have no impact on it. indeed, 
at the same levels of highly coordinated collective bargaining (wBCOOR 
= 2), there is considerable variation in wage militancy/moderation by 
contract ratification regimes. there is no wage moderation in an insti-
tutional configuration characterized by highly coordinated bargaining 
and no contract ratification, ΔweU = 0.37 percent (e.g., in sweden up 
to the early 1980s and in Belgium in some years of the 1990s), and 
considerable moderation where bargaining is highly coordinated and 
contract ratification is at the maximum score, ΔweU = -1.83 percent 
(e.g., in norway and Denmark and in ireland in the 1990s).
this cross-tabulation also suggests that contract ratification and wage 
coordination are complements with respect to the capacity to attain 
50 the latter index, a five-point scale, was created by lane Kenworthy (2003) and is the combina-
tion of four factors: the degree of bargaining centralization, the extent to which governments intervene 
in wage settlements, informal coordination through powerful associations, and pattern setting.
tABLe 2
CORReLAtION BetweeN CONtRACt RAtIfICAtION ANd wAge IN  
effICIeNCy UNItS
Countries
Contract  
Ratification  
Average Score
(1974–2000)
Wage in  
Efficiency Units
Average Year-on-Year
% Change Frequency
austria, Belgium, Canada, 
france, germany, spain,  
sweden, United states
Cr=0 0.380
(3.441)
216
australia, netherlands,  
United Kingdom
Cr=1 0.145
(4.717)
81
Denmark, finland, ireland,  
italy, norway
1<Cr<=2 –0.466–
(5.880)
135
the overall bivariate correlation coefficient between average values of contract ratification and 
average annual change of wage in efficiency units is r = – 0.64, p-value = 0.008, n = 16; standard 
deviation in parenthesis
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wage moderation. at low levels of wage coordination, which means 
decentralized bargaining, weak government intervention, no informal 
coordination, and low pattern-setting (i.e., wBCOOR less than or equal 
to 1), an increase in ratification procedures does not seem to have an 
impact on wage moderation (rows 1 to 3). rows 2 and 3 suggest that, 
if anything, more democratic procedures may lead to wage militancy 
if they are associated with a low level of bargaining coordination. On 
the contrary, at a higher level of wage coordination (rows 4 and 5), the 
effects of contract ratification on wage moderation becomes stronger—
increasing ratification procedures increases wage moderation. these 
preliminary findings are further and more systematically explored in 
the next subsection through multivariate analysis.
A tIMe-SeRIeS CROSS-SeCtIONAL ANALySIS
the theoretical framework underpinning our statistical model is that 
of a negative relationship between the real wage and unemployment 
in an imperfectly competitive labor (and product) market.51 Wages in 
efficiency units, i.e., real product wages scaled by a technologically de-
termined measure of labor productivity, are assumed to be set through 
51 Carlin and soskice 1990; layard, nickell, and Jackman 2005.
tABLe 3
PeRCeNtAge ChANge Of wAge IN effICIeNCy UNItS At  
dIffeReNt COMBINAtIONS Of CONtRACt RAtIfICAtION ANd  
wAge BARgAININg COORdINAtIONa
Index of Wage Bargaining  
Coordination (wbcoor)
Contract Ratification Index (cr)
0 1 2
0 0.200
51
0.129
33 0
0.5 0.193
42
0.887
20 0
1 0.630
13
0.33
21
1.107
22
1.5 0.384
49
0.050
44
–0.631–
23
2 0.371
58
–0.905–
12
–1.830–
41
a Cells report the average percentage change in wage in efficiency units year-on-year and 
the number of observations.
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nonmarket mechanisms. against this backdrop, we estimate a model 
in which the yearly growth rate of the wage in efficiency units responds 
to movements in aggregate demand (captured by the lagged unemploy-
ment rate) and to structural, supply-side factors, including the insti-
tutional and organizational conditions in which collective bargaining 
takes place.
the estimated equation is
gweu,it = b0 + Σ
n
 sn zn,it + Σ
j  
gj, x j,it  + Σ
p  
hph p,it  + at  + eit
where gweu,it is the yearly growth rate of the wage in efficiency units in 
country i at time t relative to t-1 ( gweu,it  = (weuit – weuit–1) / weu it–1)); the 
zs are n institutional and organizational variables; the xs are j macro-
economic and policy controls; the hs are p institutional interactions; the 
αts are (t-1) time dummies, capturing time-varying shocks affecting all 
countries simultaneously; and εi,t is the stochastic residual.
the basic vector of institutional and organizational variables is
Σ
n
 sn zn,it = s1CRit + s2WCOORi,t.
CR is the measure of contract ratification discussed above. wBCOOR is 
the wage bargaining coordination index. Using this index instead of 
a wage centralization index allows us to control for the additional in-
stitutional characteristics of the wage determination system that are 
incorporated in the coordination construct, i.e., the coordination ca-
pacities of employer associations, as underscored by David soskice.52 
Bargaining coordination has been shown to lead to wage moderation 
because it helps collective actors internalize the consequences of their 
wage policies,53 thus a negative sign is expected.
We add to this specification, one by one, additional institutional and 
organizational variables that have been argued to affect wage pressure. 
We first add the confederation hierarchy index illustrated above. if the 
neocorporatist hypothesis were true, the coefficient of this variable 
would be negative. By including the indicator of contract ratification 
and the indicator of union hierarchy in the same specification, the two 
competing hypotheses about the optimal internal structure of union 
confederations seeking to moderate wage demands are tested simulta-
neously and their relative weight assessed.
52 soskice 1990.
53 see Baccaro and rei 2007, and literature cited therein.
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another model includes the union density rate, which should be 
positively associated to wage militancy to the extent that it captures 
the monopoly power of unions. as an alternative measure of union 
power we use the collective bargaining coverage rate, which can be very 
high even when the density rate is low (as in the paradigmatic case of 
france) due to legal provisions for contract extension. this variable, 
too, should be positively correlated with wage growth.
an organizational feature that may also affect wage behavior is the 
level of interconfederation concentration. it has been argued that the 
more concentrated the membership of trade unions (ideally within a 
single union confederation), the lower the likelihood that the confed-
erations will engage in leapfrogging and cause a wage-wage spiral.54 a 
negative sign is therefore expected.
another model includes a measure of the hierarchical power of em-
ployer associations, capturing whether employer associations have the 
power to impose particular settlements or decisions on their affiliates. the 
rationale behind including this variable is that wage moderation may not 
only be a function of the unions’ capacity to exercise internal discipline, 
but is also, if not more, a function of the employers’ ability to do likewise 
within their own ranks.55 still another specification includes a compos-
ite index capturing the extent of government intervention in collective 
bargaining—from noninvolvement, to the setting of minimum wages, 
all the way to the imposition of wage freezes and prohibition of supple-
mentary local bargaining. the expectation is that higher government 
involvement in wage determination will slow down wage growth.
the last institutional variable we add is a measure of central bank 
independence. Various scholars have suggested that a central bank that 
is not accountable to political authorities can induce trade unions to 
moderate wages at given levels of unemployment by credibly threaten-
ing to deflate the economy.56 Based on this argument, we hypothesize 
a negative sign.
the vector of macroeconomic and policy controls includes
Σ
j  
gj, x j,it = g1URi,t–1 + g2 ΔURi,t–1 + g3UNBENi,t + g4 ΔTAXi,t + g5 TOTSi,t
where ur is the lagged unemployment rate; Δur is the lagged yearly 
change in unemployment; Δtax is the change in taxes, including in-
54 Carlin and soskice 1990, 113; golden 1993; iversen 1999.
55 martin 1984; swenson 1991; swank 2001; swank and martin 2001; thelen 2001; swenson 
2002; martin and swank 2004.
56 scharpf 1991; streeck 1994; Hassel 2003.
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come and indirect taxes as well as social security contributions on la-
bor, expressed as percentage of gross domestic product (gdP); unben is 
a measure of the generosity of unemployment benefits; tots captures 
terms of trade shocks measured as changes in terms of trade (ratio of 
export prices to import prices) weighted by the openness of the econ-
omy (defined as the ratio between imports plus exports to gdP).
We expect both higher levels of unemployment rate as well as change 
in unemployment to be conducive to wage moderation (negative sign). 
the inclusion of the latter term captures the possible nonlinearity of 
the relationship, which implies that the trade-off between unemploy-
ment and wage growth should become steeper as unemployment in-
creases.57 more generous unemployment benefits (replacement rates) 
should lead to higher wage outcomes (positive sign) at given levels of 
unemployment by increasing the reservation wage of workers and thus 
strengthening their bargaining power.58 the effect of changes in taxes is 
a priori unclear. if there is real wage resistance, i.e., if workers respond 
to changes in labor taxes that lower the take-home wage by pushing 
up the pretax wage, then there should be a positive relationship with 
gweı. if there is no wage resistance, then the pretax product wage should 
be unaffected. along similar lines, changes in terms of trade should 
have a negative sign if there is wage resistance.59
We also include two types of interactions. first, we interact contract 
ratification with wage bargaining coordination (CR*wBCOOR). this 
tests the hypothesis of complementarity that emerged in the previous 
cross-tabulation of data. We expect a negative sign for the interacted 
coefficient. the second interaction explores the impact of contract rati-
fication changes over time. as hypothesized above, the need to demo-
cratically legitimate the outcomes of peak-level agreements may have 
increased over time due to the declining availability of side payments 
that could compensate union members for their short-term losses.60 to 
test this hypothesis we interact the contract ratification variable with a 
linear time-trend term (tIMe). We expect this interaction to be nega-
tive, meaning that the wage-moderating effect of contract ratification 
should increase over time.61
We run various specification and robustness checks in a separate 
subsection.
57 layard, nickell, and Jackman 2005, 365.
58 layard, nickell, and Jackman 2005, 76.
59 Carlin and soskice 1990, 294–300; layard, nickell, and Jackman 2005, 209–10.
60 mares 2006.
61 a section describing variables and data sources is omitted due to space constraints. it is available 
from the authors upon request.
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eCONOMetRIC ReSULtS
Ordinary least squares (OLS) with panel-corrected standard errors is our 
estimator of choice.62 it allows us to correct for both country-specific 
heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation of the errors.63 table 4 reports 
regression results.64
the regression results fully corroborate our hypotheses. across all 
models, the macroeconomic and policy-related variables perform as ex-
pected: high levels of unemployment and of changes in unemployment 
depress wage growth, while a decline in the price of exports relative to 
imports, high levels of unemployment benefits, and increases in labor 
taxes push wages (in efficiency units) up.
Our measure of contract ratification is robustly negatively correlated 
with the dependent variable (weU), indicating that the more workers 
are involved in ratifying collective agreements, the greater the wage 
moderation. additionally, and confirming a standard result in the lit-
erature, wage bargaining coordination is robustly negatively associated 
with wage militancy. it seems that the more coordinated the bargain-
ing system, the easier it is, all other things being equal, to ensure wage 
moderation.
the clear impact of contract ratification is paired with the absence 
of an impact of union hierarchy (model 2). the coefficient is negative, 
as corporatist theory would predict, but not significantly different from 
0. similarly insignificant are the coefficients of other institutional and 
organizational variables, which might be hypothesized to affect wage 
pressure: union density (model 3); the degree of collective bargaining 
coverage (model 4); the concentration of union confederations (model 
5); the degree of centralization of employer organizations (model 6); 
the degree of government intervention in wage bargaining (model 7); 
and the degree of central bank independence (model 8).
62 the hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence of the errors is rejected (Breusch-Pagan LM 
test: chi2(120) = 159.392, p = 0.0094). similarly rejected is the hypothesis of homoskedasticity (modi-
fied Wald test: chi2(16) = 231.51, p = 0.000). We estimate static models because the null hypothesis of 
no serial correlation cannot be rejected at standard levels of confidence. since the result of the Wool-
dridge test was borderline—f(1, 15) = 3.802, Prob > f = 0.0701—as a further check we estimated a 
dynamic model with the lagged dependent variable among the predictors; the coefficient of this vari-
able was not significantly different from 0. results are omitted for reasons of space and are available 
from the authors upon request.
63 Beck and Katz 1995.
64 We did not estimate a two-way fixed-effects model with country dummies as well because an 
f-test of joint significance could not reject the hypothesis that the country fixed effects were jointly 
equal to zero: f(15, 380) = 0.80, Prob > f = 0.6809. the time dummies were instead jointly highly 
significant: f(27, 380) = 6.75, Prob > f = 0.0000.
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models 9 and 10 include interaction terms. the complementarity 
between contract ratification and wage bargaining coordination emerg-
ing by the cross-tabulation of data is confirmed in model 9. the coef-
ficient of the interaction term (CR*wBCOOR) is negative and significant. 
at the same time, the marginal effect of each variable is not signifi-
cantly different from zero when the value of the other is zero. in other 
words, in a hypothetical country where no ratification procedures are 
in place and wage bargaining is not coordinated, our estimates suggest 
that neither a unit increase in wage coordination nor a unit increase in 
contract ratification would have any significant impact on wages. in 
this model the sign of the contract ratification coefficient is positive—
thus providing some support for the corporatist view that worker in-
volvement may lead to greater wage militancy, but only when collective 
bargaining is uncoordinated.
in model 10, we relax the assumption of a constant contract ratifica-
tion coefficient and explore how it may vary over time. interestingly, 
both the time trend variable and the interaction between time trend 
and contract ratification (CR*tIMe) are negative and significant. the 
time trend, which proxies for all trended omitted variables, suggests 
that there is linear decline in wage militancy over time when other de-
terminants are controlled for. the interacted coefficient suggests that 
the wage-moderating effect of contract ratification becomes stronger 
over time. 65
figure 1 shows in a 95 percent confidence-level band how the effect 
of contract ratification on wage growth changes over time. this effect 
is significantly negatively different from zero (at 5 percent) starting 
from around 1980. We interpret this finding as suggesting that demo-
cratically legitimating collective agreements become more important as 
welfare state expansion and other side payments are no longer much of 
an option.66 Procedural legitimation becomes a substitute for outcome 
legitimation.67
65 We estimated two further models (not reported for reasons of space, but available from the 
authors): a model including a dummy variable for european monetary Union (eMU ) countries, and 
a model with an interaction between wage coordination and central bank independence. the eMU 
dummy (scoring 1 for eMU members between 1992 and 2000, and 0 otherwise) is not significant. sim-
ilarly, and surprisingly given previous results (Hall and franzese 1998; iversen 1999), the interaction 
between wage coordination and central bank independence was not only insignificant but also wrongly 
(i.e., positively) signed. this finding seems interesting and worthy of further investigation, as it sug-
gests that controlling for the previously overlooked process of contract ratification (which according to 
our argument helps union confederations moderate their wage demands), the much discussed wage-
dampening effect of the combination between independent central bank, and coordinated bargaining 
disappears.
66 Pizzorno 1978b; Katzenstein 1985; Pierson 2001; mares 2006.
67 scharpf 1999.
t
A
B
L
e
 4
M
A
IN
 R
e
g
R
e
SS
IO
N
 R
e
SU
Lt
S 
a
M
od
el
 1
 
B
as
el
in
e
M
od
el
 2
 
N
o 
Im
pa
ct
 
of
 U
ni
on
 
H
ie
ra
rc
hy
 
M
od
el
 3
 
N
o 
Im
pa
ct
 
of
 U
ni
on
 
D
en
sit
y
M
od
el
 4
N
o 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f 
B
ar
ga
in
in
g 
C
ov
er
ag
e 
M
od
el
 5
N
o 
Im
pa
ct
 
of
 U
ni
on
 
C
on
ce
nt
ra
ti
on
 
M
od
el
 6
N
o 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f 
E
m
pl
oy
er
s’ 
A
sso
cia
ti
on
s 
H
ie
ra
rc
hy
 
M
od
el
 7
N
o 
Im
pa
ct
 
of
 G
ov
er
n-
m
en
t I
nt
er
-
ve
nt
io
n 
M
od
el
 8
N
o 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f 
C
en
tr
al
 B
an
k 
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
M
od
el
 9
c
r
 In
te
ra
ct
ed
 
w
it
h 
w
b
c
o
o
r
 
M
od
el
 1
0 
G
ro
w
in
g 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f c
r
 
ov
er
 T
im
e 
C
on
tr
ac
t
–0
.4
97
**
*
–0
.4
76
**
–0
.5
35
**
–0
.4
62
**
*
–0
.4
89
**
*
–0
.4
98
**
*
–0
.5
59
**
*
–0
.6
19
**
*
0.
60
5
0.
06
38
 
ra
tifi
ca
tio
n 
( C
R
)
(0
.1
84
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.2
10
)
(0
.1
76
)
(0
.1
82
)
(0
.1
83
)
(0
.1
91
)
(0
.2
15
)
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.3
75
)
C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
of
 
w
ag
e 
ba
rg
ai
ni
ng
 
(w
B
C
O
O
R
)
–0
.6
91
**
*
(0
.2
39
)
–0
.6
96
**
(0
.2
87
)
–0
.7
21
**
*
(0
.2
48
)
–0
.9
62
**
*
(0
.2
75
)
–0
.7
01
**
*
(0
.2
35
)
–0
.7
26
**
*
(0
.2
44
)
–0
.8
78
**
*
(0
.3
33
)
–0
.7
18
**
*
(0
.2
38
)
–0
.2
75
(0
.2
80
)
–0
.6
74
**
*
(0
.2
37
)
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
–0
.1
54
**
–0
.1
67
**
–0
.1
48
**
–0
.1
69
**
*
–0
.1
56
**
–0
.1
48
**
–0
.1
62
**
–0
.1
55
**
–0
.1
47
**
–0
.1
51
**
 
ra
te
 (l
ag
ge
d)
(0
.0
67
4)
(0
.0
65
9)
(0
.0
70
8)
(0
.0
61
8)
(0
.0
68
2)
(0
.0
67
3)
(0
.0
68
8)
(0
.0
65
2)
(0
.0
65
9)
(0
.0
67
3)
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
(la
gg
ed
)
–0
.8
32
**
*
(0
.1
99
)
–0
.8
49
**
*
(0
.1
94
)
–0
.8
36
**
*
(0
.2
00
)
–0
.8
72
**
*
(0
.1
94
)
–0
.8
35
**
*
(0
.1
99
)
–0
.8
39
**
*
(0
.2
00
)
–0
.8
41
**
*
(0
.1
99
)
–0
.8
42
**
*
(0
.1
97
)
–0
.8
73
**
*
(0
.1
99
)
–0
.8
48
**
*
(0
.1
99
)
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 ta
xe
s
1.
30
8*
**
1.
28
5*
**
1.
30
4*
**
1.
25
7*
**
1.
30
2*
**
1.
30
8*
**
1.
30
8*
**
1.
28
0*
**
1.
28
7*
**
1.
29
9*
**
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.1
95
)
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.1
92
)
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.1
98
)
(0
.1
96
)
(0
.1
97
)
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
0.
02
42
**
0.
02
53
*
0.
02
41
**
0.
02
19
0.
02
27
*
0.
02
51
**
0.
02
43
**
0.
02
67
**
0.
02
30
*
0.
02
56
**
 
be
ne
fit
s
(0
.0
12
1)
(0
.0
13
1)
(0
.0
12
2)
(0
.0
14
1)
(0
.0
13
8)
(0
.0
12
0)
(0
.0
12
0)
(0
.0
11
7)
(0
.0
12
4)
(0
.0
12
0)
t
er
m
s 
of
 tr
ad
e
–1
.3
50
**
*
–1
.3
64
**
*
–1
.3
49
**
*
–1
.3
67
**
*
–1
.3
52
**
*
–1
.3
51
**
*
–1
.3
55
**
*
–1
.3
74
**
*
–1
.3
23
**
*
–1
.3
30
**
*
 
sh
oc
ks
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.1
83
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.1
81
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.1
87
)
(0
.1
85
)
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.1
89
)
U
ni
on
 c
on
fe
de
ra
-
at
io
n 
hi
er
ar
ch
y
–0
.0
63
3
(0
.1
51
)
U
ni
on
 d
en
si
ty
0.
42
8
(1
.1
22
)
C
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ba
rg
ai
n-
in
g 
co
ve
ra
ge
 ra
te
0.
01
40
(0
.0
10
4)
U
ni
on
 
co
nc
en
tr
at
io
n
–0
.2
36
(0
.6
31
)
H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l p
ow
er
 
of
 e
m
pl
oy
er
s’ 
as
so
ci
at
io
ns
0.
06
34
(0
.1
04
)
g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
0.
05
79
(0
.0
61
1)
C
en
tr
al
 b
an
k 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
–1
.2
80
(0
.8
67
)
C
R
*w
B
C
O
O
R
–0
.7
90
**
(0
.3
08
)
t
im
e 
tr
en
d 
(t
IM
e
)
–0
.1
55
**
*
(0
.0
25
7)
C
R
*t
IM
e
 
–0
.0
38
9*
(0
.0
21
2)
C
on
st
an
t
4.
25
6*
**
4.
29
6*
**
4.
11
4*
**
3.
65
1*
**
4.
46
9*
**
4.
20
8*
**
4.
18
2*
**
4.
94
3*
**
3.
78
0*
**
4.
01
5*
**
(0
.5
79
)
(0
.5
79
)
(0
.6
36
)
(0
.6
62
)
(0
.8
54
)
(0
.5
80
)
(0
.5
69
)
(0
.8
09
)
(0
.5
62
)
(0
.6
16
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
42
9
42
6
42
9
42
6
42
9
42
9
42
9
42
9
42
9
42
9
n
um
be
r o
f 
co
un
tr
ie
s
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
r
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
51
7
0.
52
1
0.
51
8
0.
52
3
0.
51
8
0.
51
8
0.
51
9
0.
52
0
0.
52
4
0.
52
0
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 g
ro
w
th
 o
f w
ag
es
 in
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 u
ni
ts
; c
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 o
f t
-1
 ti
m
e 
du
m
m
ie
s 
om
itt
ed
 d
ue
 to
 s
pa
ce
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
, b
ut
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 a
ll 
es
tim
at
io
ns
; s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
; *
**
 p
<0
.0
1,
 **
 p
<0
.0
5,
 * 
p<
0
a a
ll 
m
od
el
s 
ar
e 
O
L
S 
w
ith
 p
an
el
-c
or
re
ct
ed
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
.
616 wORLd POLItICS 
SPeCIfICAtION ANd ROBUStNeSS CheCkS
table 5 reports additional regression results. first, we estimate models 
that include different operationalizations of our key independent vari-
ables, contract ratification and wage bargaining coordination (models 1 
and 2). second, we estimate a reduced-form model by omitting macro-
economic controls that could be endogenously related to the dependent 
variable (model 3). third, we estimate the model with averaged data 
(model 4). fourth, we estimate two models (5 and 6) in which our key 
independent variables are lagged. and fifth, we consider models with 
a different operationalization of the dependent variable: model 7 does 
not include the interaction between contract ratification and wage co-
ordination; model 8 does.
Our conclusions hold even if we weigh both contract ratification 
and wage coordination by the degree of collective bargaining cover-
age (model 1). the reasoning behind this choice is that the impact of 
particular institutional features is likely to be contingent on the overall 
importance of collective bargaining in a particular country (captured 
by the bargaining coverage rate). the impact of the contract ratifica-
fIgURe 1 
effeCt Of CONtRACt RAtIfICAtION ON wAge gROwth IN effICIeNCy UNItS 
OveR tIMe IN A 95 PeRCeNt CONfIdeNCe INteRvAL
   1975                1980               1985                1990                1995               2000
Year
.5
0
–.5
–1
–1.5
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68 traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel 2001.
69 formally, this is wage share = wL
Y
Y
L
= w / = unit labor costs, where w (wage), L (labor), Y 
(product).
tion and wage bargaining coordination variables on wage growth may 
be different between countries with high and low coverage. However, 
the two institutional measures remain significant predictors of wage 
trends. in model 2 we substitute the measure of wage coordination 
with a measure of wage centralization. the contract ratification coef-
ficient is still significant but its magnitude is smaller and the standard 
error larger. While the measures of wage bargaining centralization and 
wage coordination are highly correlated (r = 0.80), contract ratification 
is (by construction) more highly correlated with wage centralization 
(r=0 .41) than with wage coordination (r = 0.24). it is therefore more 
difficult for OLS to sort out the respective contributions of wage cen-
tralization and contract ratification to movements in wages.
We then estimate a reduced-form model, omitting the two controls 
for the unemployment rate (model 3). this is intended as a further 
check on possible endogeneity problems (in addition to using one-year 
lags of the unemployment controls). in other words, it may be sus-
pected that the unemployment rate responds to wage growth in ef-
ficiency units. after omitting these terms the two institutional pre-
dictors (contract ratification and wage coordination) continue to have 
negative and significant coefficients. model 4 runs an estimate using 
three-year averaged data.68 all results are confirmed.
Our results are likewise confirmed if we lag contract ratification and 
wage coordination by three or four years (model 5 and model 6, re-
spectively). these tests rule out the possibility of reversed causation 
between wage moderation and the institutional variables, i.e., that the 
need to reduce wage militancy leads to an increase in bargaining coor-
dination and contract ratification rather than vice versa.
We then estimate the model with macroeconomic controls and in-
stitutional predictors using a different operationalization of the depen-
dent variable—the wage share. the reason for this choice is twofold. 
first, the wage share is essentially a measure of unit labor costs; it is a 
standard (albeit less refined) proxy for wage militancy.69 second, the 
measure allows us to estimate a model where both the left-hand side 
and the right-hand side of the equation are expressed in levels. Unfor-
tunately, data on wages in efficiency units are only available as an index 
number, thus making it inevitable to express the dependent variable as 
change. regression coefficients support our previous conclusions. in 
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model 7, which examines direct effects, both contract ratification and 
wage coordination are negatively signed and contract ratification is 
highly significant. in model 8, with both direct and interactive effects, 
the interaction term is negative and significant while the direct effects 
are positive and significant. in other words, when the value of the other 
variable is zero, neither variable has a negative impact on the wage 
share, i.e., on unit labor costs. On the contrary, it seems to increase the 
wage share. it is only the combination of the two variables that matters 
for labor cost containment. this confirms that wage coordination and 
contract ratification are complements.
finally, in table 6 we estimate a number of purely cross-sectional 
specifications.70 the “between estimator” is in all likelihood not the 
most appropriate for testing a model in which contract ratification is 
interacted with wage coordination, which varies more within countries 
than between. nevertheless, this extreme test addresses the problem of 
the nearly time-invariant contract ratification variable. the dependent 
variable is the average annual change of wage in efficiency units. Our 
independent variables are also averaged. With only sixteen observa-
tions, one per country in the sample, we include only our most impor-
tant institutional predictors: contract ratification, wage coordination, 
and their interaction. the macroeconomic controls are not expected 
to have any impact on the long-run rate of growth of the wage in ef-
ficiency units, so they are excluded. We estimate models for the overall 
period 1974–2000 (models 1 and 2); for 1974–89 (models 3 and 4); 
and for 1989–2000 (models 5 and 6). in other words, we distinguish 
between the period of classic political exchange following the two oil 
crises (1974–89) and the age of new social pacts (1990–2000) in which 
trade unions were no longer compensated for wage moderation through 
side payments.71
the results of cross-sectional regressions are less straightforward than 
those of the time-series cross-sectional analysis, but overall are in line 
with them. even with only sixteen observations, contract ratification 
emerges as the most important institutional predictor of wage mod-
eration. its coefficients for the entire period 1974–2000 are negative 
and significant (models 1 and 2). Controlling for contract ratification, 
70 We also performed (but do not present here) a jackknife analysis (excluding one country at a 
time) on the model presented in table 4, column 1. this suggested that the model is robust to pres-
ence or absence of particular countries in the sample. in particular, the two institutional variables, 
wage coordination and contract ratification, do not depend on any particular country for statistical 
significance.
71 regini 1997; Wallerstein, golden, and lange 1997; Perez 2000; Compston 2002; Culpepper 
2002; molina and rhodes 2002; traxler 2004; Hassel 2006; Hamann and Kelly 2007; avdagic 2010.
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the degree of wage bargaining coordination (i.e., the institution all 
previous literature has focused on) is not significantly associated with 
wage moderation in the 1974–2000 regressions. the coefficients of 
both contract ratification and wage coordination are positive albeit in-
significant in the 1974–89 period (models 3 and 4). this is strange but 
not completely unexpected since the results shown in figure 1 (which 
is derived from table 4, model 10) indicate that the impact of contract 
ratification becomes significantly different from zero only in the 1980s. 
the same coefficients are negative and significant in the period 1990–
2000 (the era of new social pacts).72 additionally, in the 1990–2000 
72 in the interacted models, each of the variables in the interactive term is expressed as deviation 
from the sample mean. this allows one to interpret the direct effects of contract ratification and co-
ordination of wage bargaining in the interacted models as referring to the average country (for which 
the interacted term is zero).
tABLe 6
CROSS-SeCtIONAL RegReSSIONS IN dIffeReNt PeRIOdSa
Model 1 
 
Baseline
1974–2000 
Model 2
1974–2000 
with
cr*wbcoor 
Interaction 
Model 3 
 
Baseline
1974–1989 
Model 4
1974–1989 
with
cr*wbcoor 
Interaction 
Model 5 
 
Baseline
1990–2000 
Model 6
1990–2000 
with
cr*wbcoor 
Interaction 
Contract –0.430** –0.381* 0.0638 0.0588 –1.030*** –0.700**
 ratification  
 (CR)
(0.171) (0.199) (0.119) (0.149) (0.288) (0.248)
Coordination  
of wage 
bargaining 
(wBCOOR)
0.0368
(0.135)
–0.0404
(0.175)
0.211
(0.149)
0.219 
(0.196)
–0.388
(0.283)
–0.675**
(0.250)
CR*wBCOOR  –0.197  0.0190  –1.011***
  (0.241)  (0.250)  (0.325)
Constant 0.330** 0.405* 0.140 0.133 0.727** 0.987***
 (0.143) (0.190) (0.158) (0.208) (0.325) (0.243)
Observations 16 16 16 16 16 16
r-squared 0.407 0.425 0.130 0.130 0.652 0.790
Dependent variable: growth of wages in efficiency units yearly average; all models are robust to a 
jackknife test done by excluding one country at the time; each of the variables interacted is expressed 
as deviation from the sample mean, i.e., the direct effects of contract ratification and coordination 
of wage bargaining in the interacted models can be interpreted as referring to the average country; 
(White-) robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a all models are OLS estimations.
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period there is a strong complementarity between these institutions 
(models 5 and 6).73
the finding that contract ratification and wage coordination are not 
associated with wage moderation in the 1974–89 period may be a sta-
tistical incident and we do not put much store on it, especially since it 
contradicts both the theory and the practice of institutionalized wage 
moderation in this period. nevertheless, it may indicate that the wage 
moderating effects of contract ratification, wage coordination, and their 
interaction apply only to the 1990s and not to the preceding period.74
to summarize, the econometric analysis reveals a new, previously 
overlooked correlation between wage moderation and the internal gov-
ernance processes of trade union confederations. it also suggests that 
worker involvement in contract ratification and collective bargaining 
coordination are complements: each individually reduces wage mili-
tancy (all other things being equal) and together they magnify each 
other’s effect. the effect is particularly robust in the 1990–2000 pe-
riod—an era in which trade union moderation was no longer compen-
sated by sizeable side-payments.
this article next examines the mechanisms underlying the statistical 
correlations uncovered through large-N analysis. We argue that statisti-
cal analysis is indispensable to uncovering relationships of covariation 
among variables, but needs to be complemented by a narrative that 
illustrates the generative processes by which, through the actions and 
interactions of human agents, such relationships are produced.75 We 
focus on developments in ireland and italy. these are the only two 
countries in our sample in which the index of contract ratification in-
creases over time. they are also the two countries in which the index 
of collective bargaining coordination increases the most between the 
1980s and 1990s. in brief, they are the two cases that most clearly ex-
emplify the institutional interaction between bargaining coordination 
and contract ratification highlighted by the econometric analysis.
73 in another test, we have added one by one to each cross-sectional model all the institutional 
variables that we have tested in the time-series cross-section analysis (see table 4). none of the in-
stitutional variables reached significance at standard levels in any of the three time periods, barring 
government intervention, which reached significance at 5 percent in the model for 1974–2000 (al-
though with a sign opposite to expectations), and union density, positive as expected and significant at 
1 percent in the model for 1974–89.
74 We also performed (but do not present here) a jackknife analysis on the model presented in table 
6, column 6. results held when the model was reestimated excluding one country at a time.
75 esser 1996; goldthorpe 2001, 3; Hedström 2005; elster 2007.
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wAge BARgAININg ANd UNION gOveRNANCe IN IReLANd  
ANd ItALy
During the 1990s, ireland and italy experienced a dramatic transfor-
mation of their wage determination systems. Beginning in late 1987, 
ireland moved from an essentially decentralized enterprise-based col-
lective bargaining system to a completely centralized and coordinated 
system, thanks to a succession of seven centralized pacts involving gov-
ernment, employers, and unions, each lasting three years. these pacts 
regulated wage dynamics in all sectors simultaneously. they also deter-
mined exactly what percentage increases, if any at all, could be negoti-
ated at the peripheral levels.
in italy, too, the 1990s were the decade of centralized bargaining. a 
centralized agreement abolished wage indexation in 1992 and banned 
enterprise-level bargaining. in 1993, government, employers, and 
unions agreed to a new architecture of collective bargaining in which 
industry-level bargaining (every two years) was tightly linked to gov-
ernment inflation targets and assigned the role of protecting real wages 
against purchasing-power erosion, while enterprise-level bargaining 
(every four years) was to redistribute productivity increases. this bar-
gaining system was the object of new negotiations in 1998, which con-
firmed its dual structure.
the emergence of centralized institutions in ireland and italy oc-
curred despite the apparently inhospitable institutional and organiza-
tional characteristics of the two countries, at least according to prevailing 
scholarly views. in 1988, an irish scholar wrote that “the organizational 
and political conditions which would tend to be conducive to sustain-
ing neo-corporatist agreements were not well developed in ireland, 
therefore concertative wage bargaining could not develop very far. in 
particular, the trade union movement’s authoritative centralization was 
limited, and it was constrained in its ability to devise a central strategy 
and secure the compliance of all affiliates.”76 similar judgments were 
often expressed about italy. indeed, italy was constantly ranked at or 
near the bottom of the various indexes of corporatism and regarded as 
a problem case among advanced nations.
in both countries union structure remained relatively fragmented 
in comparative perspective.77 in terms of processes, both union move-
76 Hardiman 1988, 3.
77 in ireland (but not in italy), the ICtU increased its internal concentration through union merg-
ers. there were fifteen such mergers between 1985 and 1989, and seventeen between 1990 and 1994 
(roche and ashmore 2002, table 5). With fifty-two unions affiliated to the ICtU in 1995, the irish 
labor movement was still more fragmented than most.
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ments stepped up their levels of organizational democracy as they ar-
ranged extensive consultations of union members (as well as of non-
members in italy) combined with binding workers’ referendums on 
key collective agreements. in ireland, the practice of balloting became 
more prevalent in the 1990s—it was less widely practiced before then, 
when consultations were more informal.78 to understand how these in-
ternal organizational processes helped confederation leaders mobilize 
internal consensus for policies that were not immediately perceived as 
beneficial by the union constituency, we focus on the formative mo-
ments of wage bargaining coordination in both countries.
the INStItUtIONALIzAtION Of COORdINAted BARgAININg
in ireland the first centralized pact, the Program for national recovery 
(PNR) of 1987, was the most politically contested of the lot. the lead-
ers of the irish Confederation of trade Unions (ICtU) were favorably 
inclined towards it—the country faced a serious macroeconomic crisis, 
and they were concerned that the government might respond thatcher-
style with an all-out attack on trade unions.79 in particular, public sector 
unions were afraid they would fare especially poorly in free-for-all bar- 
gaining, given the government’s emphasis on cutting expenditures.80
the various unions affiliated to the ICtU had, however, mixed feel-
ings. in particular, the craft unions (representing skilled workers in 
the private sector) were against the PNR because they perceived de-
centralized bargaining as more advantageous for them. among gen-
eral unions, the two largest—the irish transport and general Workers 
Union (ItgwU) and the federated Workers Union of ireland (fwUI) 
—supported the deal. the third largest general union, the amalgam-
ated transport and general Workers Union (AtgwU), was adamantly 
opposed to it. as stated above, public sector unions generally favored 
the agreement.
aware of the controversial status of the proposed PNR, the ICtU en-
gaged in a highly proceduralized decision-making process that relied 
on electoral rules similar to those used to elect the american president. 
if 50 percent plus one voter in a union chose to support the option to 
78 interviews by Baccaro with esther lynch, ICtU legislation and social affairs officer, ireland, June 
8, 2007; and with Patricia O’Donovan, former deputy secretary general of the ICtU, geneva, april 9, 
2001; field research.
79 interviews by Baccaro with Bill attley, former general secretary of the fwUI and the services, 
industrial, Professional, and technical Union (SIPtU), Bundoran, ireland, July 3, 2001; and with Da-
vid Begg, ICtU general secretary, Bundoran, ireland, July 4, 2001.
80 interview by Baccaro with Peter mcloonne, general secretary of IMPACt, Bundoran, ireland, 
July 4, 2001.
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endorse (or reject) the PNR agreement, all the delegates of that union 
voted for (or against) that option in a national convention especially 
summoned. as with the american process, the rule implied that the 
ICtU could end up pursuing a policy that was supported by less than a 
majority of workers if the larger unions approved it by close margins 
(as they did) while the smaller unions rejected it by larger margins. 
However, this possibility did not detract from the legitimacy of the 
collective decision to support the PNR. the unions that lost the vote did 
not secede or mobilize to pursue their own independent wage policy; 
they all abided by the will of the majority.
most of the fifty-six unions attending the special conference on the 
PNR voted against the agreement, with the largest unions conducting 
worker ballots to decide how to allocate their votes. the ItgwU, the larg-
est union of all, had forty-eight delegates and its votes were crucial. it 
ran a ballot of its members and the PNR passed by only 400 votes.81 the 
union convention then approved the agreement with 181 votes to 114.
in italy, the union decision to engage in centralized bargaining was 
also highly controversial. the internal process was remarkably similar 
to the irish case because in italy, too, the unions relied on organiza-
tional referenda to mobilize consensus among the workers. the 1992 
tripartite agreement abolishing wage indexation provoked a major cri-
sis in the unions, especially within the largest confederation, the italian 
general Confederation of labor (CgIL). in the fall of 1992 numerous 
factory councils mobilized against the abolition of the popular wage 
indexation mechanism (scala mobile). interestingly, protesters focused 
just as much on the content of the agreement (which, of course, they 
rejected) as on the decision-making process. Because the agreement 
had not been preceded by a consultation of the workers affected, they 
claimed it was illegitimate and unrepresentative of the workers’ will.82
italian union leaders learned the lesson. the 1993 agreement, unlike 
its 1992 analogue, was preceded by a binding referendum among the 
workers—a first in the history of the italian labor movement. With 
the grassroots mobilization that had taken place one year earlier fresh 
in their minds, the confederation leaders asked for and obtained from 
their bargaining counterparts sufficient time to organize a secret ballot 
81 interview by Baccaro with Bill attley, former general secretary of the fwUI and SIPtU, Bun-
doran, ireland, July 3, 2001.
82 interviews by Baccaro with tino magni, secretary general of the federazione impiegati Operai 
metalmeccanici (fIOM), sesto san giovanni, italy, June 3, 1997; with edoardo Bano, head of organi-
zation, labor Chamber of Bergamo, Bergamo, italy, June 9, 1997; and with savino Pezzotta, secretary 
general of the italian Confederation of trade Unions, milan, italy, June 10, 1997.
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among the rank-and-file workers. although the tentative agreement 
between the government, employers, and union leaders was reached 
on July 3, 1993, the actual agreement was not signed until July 23. in 
the intervening twenty days, the confederation unions set up approxi-
mately 30,000 assemblies in the country’s major plants and offices to 
explain the agreement. While 1.5 million workers participated in the 
vote and 68 percent of them approved the agreement, the consultation 
identified large pockets of dissent. the employees of some historic au-
tomotive plants—alfa arese near milan, mirafiori in turin, and OM 
iveco in Brescia, for example—voted against the accord (sometimes 
overwhelmingly). the majority of workers in the cities of milan and 
Brescia—two strongholds of the italian labor movement—also rejected 
the accord.
the history of the italian labor movement features several examples 
of rank-and-file mobilization against union policies that were per-
ceived as too moderate, particularly by industrial workers. in the past, 
similar mobilization had all but quashed analogous attempts at collec-
tive bargaining reform.83 this time, however, the dissenting groups did 
not openly mobilize even though their inaction did not reflect approval 
of the agreement. for example, the essere sindacato faction (the hard 
liners) within the CgIL declared well before the conclusion of the 1993 
negotiation that the forthcoming compromise looked “awful” and that 
“it would be a mistake to reach an agreement.”84 similarly, the la-
bor Chamber of Brescia promised “a new Hot autumn.”85 However, 
the situation was procedurally different than it had been in 1992. the 
agreement contained two important responses to the procedural cri-
tique previously raised by the dissident factions. first, it institutional-
ized the regular election of workplace representatives. second, it was 
accompanied by a binding consultation among the workers. although 
they clearly frowned on the agreement’s content, the dissident groups 
concentrated their energies not on organizing grassroots protest but 
rather on dissuading workers in the assemblies from approving the 
agreement.
some of these groups had something to say about the process. a 
few, for example, complained that “in the assemblies, only union lead-
ers who were in favor of the agreement [were] allowed to speak.”86 Yet, 
83 lange and Vannicelli 1982; golden 1988.
84 Il Sole-24 Ore, June 18, 1993.
85 Il Manifesto, July 10, 1993.
86 Il Sole-24 Ore, July 23, 1993.
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in the end, none contested the outcome of the consultation, that is, the 
clear endorsement of the July 1993 agreement by the majority of the 
italian workers.
MeChANISMS Of CONSeNSUS MOBILIzAtION
Union leaders have a number of options when faced with the need to 
push through a bargaining policy that meets with less than enthusias-
tic approval from their constituencies. they can try to impose it upon 
those constituencies if institutional and organizational conditions allow 
them to do so. this is the neocorporatist recipe. alternatively, they can 
compensate losers with side payments. this option was increasingly 
impracticable in the 1990s. indeed, national bargaining was not made 
smoother in either ireland or italy by an increase in public expendi-
tures. On the contrary, one of the explicit goals of national bargaining 
was to limit such growth.87
another possibility is for union leaders to assuage internal ten-
sions by scaling up bargaining demands. in this case, internal cohesion 
would probably be more easily preserved than in the case of hierarchi-
cal imposition but (to the extent that unions have market power—the 
assumption guiding this and other studies) at the cost of greater wage 
militancy. still another option is for union leaders to rely on procedural 
mechanisms to try and persuade dissenting worker groups to go along 
with a bargaining strategy they do not necessarily like.
this last approach was adopted by union leaders in ireland and italy. 
in both case studies it looks as if a majority of workers favored the 
moderate bargaining policies proposed by confederation leaders. How-
ever, implementing a centralized wage policy implied circumventing a 
vocal internal faction that claimed to be representative, particularly in 
the italian case, of the whole working class. this radical faction had 
considerable mobilization capacities and, in the italian case at least, it 
had previously blocked prior experiments with centralized bargaining.
the adoption of majority rule as a decision-making principle leveled 
out the different degrees of intensity of the workers’ preferences.88 the 
vote of workers who were more likely to engage in collective action 
counted as much as that of more quiescent workers in determining 
collective decisions. the fact that the radical factions did not mobilize 
against the outcome of the vote may reflect a procedural justice effect 
as described by social psychologists, i.e., an increased willingness to 
87 Baccaro and simoni 2007; roche 2007.
88 Dahl 1956.
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go along with unfavorable outcomes if the process that has generated 
them can be perceived as procedurally fair.89
although we assume that a favorable majority towards centralized 
wage regulation was already in re and that the democratic process 
simply facilitated its emergence, we cannot exclude that the process 
of debate preceding the vote (in union assemblies) contributed to the 
creation of such a favorable majority. indeed, in a companion paper we 
present microevidence that this may be the case based on a representa-
tive random sample of italian workers covering both those who en-
gaged and those who did not engage in a union referendum.90 in other 
words, leaders may have been able to convince at least some workers 
that wage moderation was in their best interest by using the force of 
argument and persuasion.91
the evidence suggests that worker ballots augmented the credibility 
of confederation leaders and weakened the resistance of militant groups 
by providing clear evidence that the choice of moderate wage demands 
was not an arbitrary imposition of self-interested union bureaucrats but 
was supported by the majority of workers. these legitimacy resources 
substituted for waning material compensation and facilitated internal 
compliance with peak-level stipulations.
CONCLUdINg ReMARkS
this article deals with a classic theme in the literature on comparative 
political economy: understanding what impact particular collective bar-
gaining institutions have on a country’s economic performance. We fo-
cus on wage moderation (measured as wage growth in efficiency units) 
as the most direct link between the functioning of a national industrial-
relations system and economic outcomes. econometric analysis shows 
that worker involvement in the ratification of collective agreements is 
associated with wage moderation, especially in the 1990s. in addition, 
it is a complement to coordinated wage bargaining (the institutional 
characteristic all previous literature has focused upon)—the stronger 
the involvement of workers in contract ratification, the stronger the ef-
fect of coordinated wage bargaining on dampening wage growth.
the case studies of ireland and italy highlight, in turn, that wage 
89 lind and tyler 1988.
90 Baccaro 2010.
91 an italian trade union leader argued that union assemblies have the capacity to change about 20 
percent of the workers’ preferences (interview with Carlo spreafico, milan, italy, June 16, 1997). see 
also Habermas 1984.
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policies are the result of a heated internal political process within union 
confederations involving groups with different views about bargaining 
strategy and feasible wage demands. the case studies also show that 
unions that go through a process of democratic legitimation are able 
to reconcile conflicting internal claims at lower levels of wage demands 
than unions whose leaders make decisions autonomously.
We conclude with a few cautionary notes on the view that wage 
moderation is unequivocally a good thing for a country’s economic 
performance. it is generally assumed that wage moderation increases 
employment by pushing the wage-setting curve rightward. However, 
considering the irish and italian cases, the argument for a positive link-
age between wage moderation and unemployment reduction is only 
valid for the former country. Wage militancy and unemployment both 
declined dramatically in ireland after the introduction of centralized 
bargaining in late 1987. a look at the italian case reveals the relation-
ship is not as clear-cut. Wages slowed down considerably in italy after 
the abolition of wage indexation in 1992, but unemployment contin-
ued to rise for several years.
this contrast suggests that the impact of wage moderation is possibly 
contingent on the particular growth path of a country and that lower 
growth of wages in efficiency units may translate into lower unemploy-
ment only in countries such as ireland, in which foreign demand is by 
far the most important component of aggregate demand.92 in countries 
with large domestic markets, like italy, the impact of wage moderation 
on external competitiveness may be counterbalanced by lower domestic 
demand and overall lower aggregate demand. this, however, is a topic 
for another paper.
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